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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Multiattribute Utility Theory (MAUT) provides a conceptual framework that allows 
linking  Multicriteria  Decision  Making  (MCDM)  to  economics  and  decision  theory  by 
defining a Multiattribute Utility Function (MAUF). This utility function comprises all the 
relevant attributes to be optimized by the decision maker, subject to all the constraints 
of the problem (see Keeney and Raiffa 1976 for a classic reference). 
 
Once  the  existence  of  a  MAUF  is  accepted,  the  practical  implementation  of  this 
approach faces at least two technical difficulties. First, the mathematical specification 
for the MAUF must be chosen, and second, the parameters of this function need to be 
elicited  by  some  estimation  or  calibration  procedure.  Actually,  both  problems  are 
strongly  connected  in  practice,  because  the  availability  of  an  elicitation  procedure 
strongly determines the selection of a specific function. 
 
Assume there are n relevant attributes and the preferences of the decision maker for 
these  attributes  are  represented  by  the  monoattribute  utility  functions  ui  (i=1,…,n). 
Keeney (1974) and Keeney and Raiffa (1976) demonstrated that, if the attributes are 
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where  U  and  u1,…,un  are  normalized  to  be  bounded  between  zero  (for  the  worst 
possible value) and one (for the best possible value) and k is a scaling constant that 












i k   and,  as  a 
consequence,  0 ¹ k , then the general utility function proposed by Keeney and Raiffa 
can be expressed in the following multiplicative form: 
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The conventional way to elicit the parameters of the MAUF in applied studies is to use 
face-to-face surveys in order to get direct information from decision makers about the 
weight attached to each criterion in the decision making process (see Tiwari et al., 
1999, Linares and Romero, 2000, Prato and Hajkowicz, 2001). On the other hand, 
Sumpsi et al. (1997) proposed a non-interactive method to elicit the weights given by 
farmers to each criterion, so that these weights are “compatible not with the answers of 
the farmers to artificial questionnaires but compatible to the actual behavior which they 
follow”  (p.  65).  These  weights  can  be  understood  as  sensible  estimates  for  the 
parameters  n k k ,..., 1  in a linear MAUF as [2] (see Sumpsi et al., 1997, Gómez-Limón 
and  Berbel,  1999,  Berbel  and  Gómez-Limón,  2000,  or  Gómez-Limón  and  Riesgo, 
2004). 
 
Specification [2] can be understood as a limiting case of [1], implying that [2] is more 
restrictive  or,  equivalently,  that  [1]  is  more general  and  flexible,  so  that  it  could  be 
potentially  more  accurate  in  some  real  situations.  Nevertheless,  specification  [2]  is 
chosen much more often than [1] for obvious technical reasons: the linear structure of 
[2] makes the interpretation of the parameters much more apparent and, therefore, it is 
easier  for  the  decision  makers  to  reveal  their  preferences  as  measured  by  these 
parameters in a survey. Furthermore, the linear structure of [2] allows the natural use of 
an indirect linear elicitation method such as the one proposed by Sumpsi et al. (1997) 
without the need of interactive surveys
1. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no equivalent (non interactive) method to elicit 
the parameters of a nonlinear function as [1] and the only available procedures require 
                                                 
1 As a further argument to use a linear MAUF, some authors have claimed that, in some cases, it seems to 
represent a reasonably close approximation to a hypothetical real utility function (Edwards, 1977; Farmer, 
1987; Huirne and Hardaker, 1998; Amador et al., 1998). As a matter of fact, a linear expression can be 
considered as a good local approximation to a nonlinear one, so that, if the environment under which the 
decision making process takes place is very stable and close to a initial observed situation, the linear 
approach is likely to be accurate enough. Nevertheless, an estimated linear function will not be probably 
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direct  surveys.  Furthermore,  the  nonlinear  structure  makes  the  interpretation  of  the 
parameters  more  obscure  so  that  the  questions  in  the  surveys  need  to  be  more 
artificial, typically involving lotteries rather than the values of the criteria themselves 
(see, for example, Herath, 1981, Herath et al., 1982, Le Galès et al., 2002). 
 
In this paper, we propose a non interactive method to elicit the parameters of nonlinear 
utility  functions  starting  from  the  structure  of  the  problem  and  from  the  observed 
behavior of the decision makers. From an analytical point of view, the method consists 
of writing the problem of determining the values of the parameters, given the observed 
decision, as a dual problem of that of making the optimal decision, given the values of 
the parameters. From a conceptual point of view, the idea is to make the observed 
decision  to  be  consistent  with  a  rational  decision  making  process  by  finding  an 
expression of the utility function that reaches its maximum at the observed point. We 
use the fact that a rational decision maker will always choose an efficient solution, so 
that  we  can  restrict  the  feasible  set  to  an  auxiliary  set  given  just  by  the  efficient 
solutions.  When  the  efficient  set  is  not  fully  known,  an  operative  approximation  is 
needed.  Our  proposal  to  elicit  the  parameters  of  the  MAUF  is  independent  of  the 
method used for this approximation, but we present an application in which the efficient 
set is approximated by means of a simple linear procedure combining the elements of 
the payoff matrix. This procedure gives satisfactory results for our case study, but more 
sophisticated methods can be applied if required. 
 
Section 2 presents the problem to be solved and the method proposed to solve it. 
Section 3 offers an application for a Spanish agricultural system in which we compare 
the  simulation  ability  of  both  the  linear  and  the  multiplicative  form  of  the  function 
proposed  by  Keeney  and  Raiffa  (1976). We  come  up  with  the  result  that,  in  most 
cases, the multiplicative specification provides a better approximation to the observed 




2.1 The problem 
 
The main idea of our proposal is to make observed decisions to be consistent with a 







http://www.upo.es/econ   5 
has a vector x of decision variables and two criteria over which his preferences are 
represented by the mono-attribute utility functions  ) ( 1 x u ,  ) ( 2 x u . Let us postulate the 
existence of a multiattribute utility function: 
[ ] ) ( ), ( x u   x u U 2 1           [ ] 3  
which is partially unknown. To focus on the proposed method to elicit U , assume that 
) ( 1 x u  and  ) ( 2 x u  are fully known. For the decision maker the problem is to choose the 
value  of  x  to  maximize  [ ] 3   subject  to  W Î x ,  where  W  is  the  feasible  set  for  the 
decision variables in x. Figure 1 shows an example where the feasible set, in terms of 
1 u   and  2 u ,  is  given  by  the  polygon  ABCDE.  The  figure  also  shows  the  map  of 
indifference curves of the decision maker (those combinations providing a fixed value 
of function  U ). It is important to stress that, the decision maker being rational, the 
optimal solution will belong to the efficient set which in this example is represented by 
segment  AB.  Specifically,  the  optimal  decision  is  located  at  point  * P ,  where  an 
indifference curve (that one as far as possible from the origin) is tangent to the efficient 
set. Using the fact that the solution necessarily belongs to the efficient set, we can 
represent the decision problem as the following auxiliary problem: 
AB u u t s
u u U
u u
Î ) , ( . .
) , ( max
2 1
2 1
, 2 1         [ ] 4  
where  the  feasible  set  is  replaced  by  the  efficient  set.  This  simplification  is  both 
theoretically sound and operationally convenient for our methodology. Moreover, in [4] 
the decision variables are  1 u  and  2 u  rather than x, which is an innocuous change of 
variable if the mono-attribute utility functions are known. 
 
The  elicitation  problem  can  be  stated  in  the  following  terms:  we  can  observe  the 
decision actually made (in the example, point  * P ) and, typically, we also know the 
feasible set, from which we can construct, or at least approximate, the efficient set. 
Using this information we need to find a function such that the tangency condition holds 
exactly at the observed point  * P . If we postulate a specific parametric expression for 
U , the problem can be seen as finding the value of the parameters in this expression 
in such a way that the tangency conditions are satisfied at  * P . 
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Assume the efficient set is given by the equation  9 . 1 5 . 1 2 1 = + u u  and, by construction, 
the mono-attribute utility functions are bounded so that  1 , 0 2 1 £ £ u u . Let us postulate a 
multiplicative multiattribute utility function of the Cobb-Douglas type, as in Stam and 
Duarte-Silva (2003): 
2 1 ) ( ) ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1
w w u u u u U =         [ ] 5  
where  1 w , 2 w  are unknown parameters to be elicited. Assume, furthermore, that we 
can observe the decisions made by the decision-maker and these decisions provide 
the values  7 . 0 1= u ,  8 . 0 2= u , which can be understood as the solution for the problem 
of maximizing  [ ] 5  subject to  9 . 1 5 . 1 2 1 = + u u . From the first order conditions of this 
problem, we get  2 1 2 1 5 . 1 w w u u =  and, using the observed values for  1 u ,  2 u , we can 
conclude that  1 2 7 12 w w = . Finally, using the common normalization  1 2 1 = + w w , we 
get the estimates  19 / 7 1 = w , 19 / 12 2 = w . 
 
2.3  Determining  the  efficient  set  and  the  reference  point:  a  simple  linear 
approach 
 
The proposed procedure has two main steps: first, determining the efficient set and the 
reference  point,  and  second,  finding  the  values  of  the  parameters  such  that  the 
tangency conditions meet exactly at the reference point. This section elaborates on the 
first part. 
 
In practice, it may well be the case that decision makers are not fully efficient, so that 
their decisions may not belong to the efficient set (for example, point  P  in Figure 1). 
Since  an  inefficient  decision  cannot  be  reconciled  with  a  rational  decision  making 
process, we propose to project the observed point on the efficient frontier by finding 
that efficient point as close as possible to the observed one. For example, in Figure 1, 
point  P  is projected on  * P . We can interpret the distance between both points as an 
error made by the decision maker. We label P
* as reference point, and it is taken as a 
surrogate  of  P .  If  the  observed  point  is  efficient,  then  the  reference  point  is  the 
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INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
If the knowledge of the problem allows us to specify an analytical expression for the 
efficient set, this can be used as the “landing surface” for the utility function. Otherwise, 
some  approximation  technique  for  the  efficient  set  is  needed.  In  this  section,  we 
propose  a  simple  linear  method  which  is  used  in  the  application  presented  below 
(section 3), but the rest of the elicitation procedure is independent of the approach 
followed to construct the efficient set. Our proposal is to approximate the efficient set 
by the hyperplane connecting the elements of the payoff matrix. As noted by André et 
al. (2004), these elements turn out to be efficient if properly constructed, an we claim 
that  combining  them  can  provide  a  good  enough  approximation  in  some  cases. 
Specifically,  it  seems  to  work  rather  well  for  our  case  study  but  more  precise 
approximations can be made (at the cost of a higher computational burden) if needed
2. 
In Annex A we present in detail how to compute the elements of the payoff matrix to 
ensure  that  they  are  efficient.  Moreover,  we  propose  to  express  those  elements  in 
terms  of  (mono-attribute)  utilities.  Although  this  step  is  not  crucially  needed,  it  is 
convenient for operational purposes: by working with utilities we eliminate any problem 
of heterogeneity between units of measurement, because all ui(x)’s are normalized by 
construction  (typically  between  0  -for  the  worst  value-  and  1  -for  the  best  value). 
Furthermore, we do not need to distinguish between “more is better” or “less is better” 
attributes, because “more” is always better when dealing with utilities. 
 
Assume the feasible set is given the polygon ABCDEFG shown in Figure 2. In this 
example, the set of efficient solutions is given by BCD. The linear convex combinations 
of  the  points  of the  payoff matrix  are  given  by  the  hyperplane  BD.  Concerning the 
reliability of this approximation, in some cases (such as the example in Figure 1) a 
linear combination of the elements of the payoff matrix provides exactly the efficient 
set, so that there is no approximation error. In other cases (such as the example in 
Figure 2), some approximation error can be made
3. 
 
                                                 
2 Other classic methods to obtain the efficient set are the constraint method, the weighting method or the 
multicriterion Simplex method (Romero and Rehman 1989, pp. 71-74, for a brief introduction). See also 
Evans (1984) for an overview. 
3 We could also get the paradoxical situations that, if the decision maker is not fully efficient (so that the 
observed  point  is  below  the  efficient  set),  projecting  on  the  linear  combinations  of  the  payoff  matrix 
provides a better approximation to the real observed behaviour than projecting on the true efficient set. For 
example, if the observed point is P in Figure 2, the projection (P
*) on the linear approximation of the payoff 
matrix can be closer to reality than the projection (P
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INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
Once we have constructed the payoff matrix (in terms of utilities), we need to determine 
the reference point. If the observed point belongs to the hyperplane BD, then it should 
be  taken  as  the  reference  point  itself.  Otherwise,  it  needs  to  be  projected  on  the 
(approximation of the) efficient set. Following Sumpsi et al. (1997), this can be done by 
solving the following system of  1 n +  equations: 
￿ = w













         [ ] 6  
                                    
where  i u  is the observed value of the i-th criterion and  ij u  is the ij-th element of the 
payoff matrix. If a positive solution exists, then the observed point is a linear convex 
combination of the payoff matrix (in terms of Figure 2, it belongs to BD) and it can be 
taken as the reference point. Otherwise, we need to project the observed point on the 
hyperplane connecting the points of the payoff matrix. We propose to do this by finding 
the  closest  point  (according  to  the  Euclidean  metric)  by  solving  the  following  goal 
programming problem: 
       
1 ...






= w + + w
= ³ w








n i p n
u p n u u t s
p n
           [ ] 7  
where ni (pi) is the negative (positive) deviation variable from the observed value ui. 






*  where  j u  is the j-th column of 
the payoff matrix. 
 
Finally, we need to find an analytical expression for (the approximation of) the efficient 
set, i.e. an equation like 
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to be satisfied by all the elements in the efficient set. We follow the simplest approach 
which is to estimate a linear function
4: 
0 ... ) ,..., ( 2 2 1 0 1 = b + + b + + b = n n n u u u u u F      [ ] 9  
that  needs  to  be  met  by  the  q  columns  of  the  payoff  matrix  and  from  which  the 
parameters b  can be calculated by standard linear methods. 
 
2.4 Eliciting the parameters of the utility function: a dual approach 
 
As  shown  in  section  2.1,  the  problem  of  the  decision  maker  can  be  expressed  as 
deciding the values of u1,…,un to 
0 ) ,..., ( . .







u u F t s
u u U
         [ ] 10  
where  0 ) ,..., ( 1 = n u u F   represents  the  efficient  set  and  we  postulate  a  parametric 
multiattribute  utility  function  ) , ,..., ( 1 g n u u U ,  g   being  a  vector  of  parameters  to  be 
elicited. Assume also that the function is concave so that the first order conditions of 
problem [ ] 10  provide a maximum. Manipulating these first order conditions we get the 
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      [ ] 11  
where, if the linear approximation  [ ] 9  is used,  i i n u u u F b = ¶ ¶ ) ,..., ( 1 . By substituting 
the reference values (those obtained from P
*) of u1,…,un in  [ ] 11  we get a system of 
equations where the parameters  g  are unknowns. This is the key system to be solved 
in order to elicit the values of the parameters. Typically, we need to solve the system 
[ ] 11  including some normalization constraint and/or some restriction on the values of 
the parameters for the utility function to have desirable properties (for example, the 
parameters being nonnegative and smaller than one, etc).  
                                                 
4 Since the generic equation of a q-dimensional hyperplane has n+1 parameters ( 0 b , 1 b , …,  n b ) we can 
arbitrarily normalize one of them to be equal to 1. We choose  1 b =1 for computational convenience: since 
we need later on to compute the ratios of the  b ’s, fixing the denominator to be always equal to one can 
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If  we  represent  these  constraints  as  ￿ Î g ,  where  ￿   is  the  feasible  set  for  the 
parameters, the resulting system is  [ ] ￿} , 11 { Î g . We can find three cases: 
1.- The easiest case happens when there is a unique feasible solution for the system, 
as  illustrated  in  the  example  shown  in  section  2.2.  Then  this  solution  provides  the 
elicited parameter values. 
2.- If the system  [ ] ￿} , 11 { Î g  is unfeasible, we can conclude that the reference point 
(observed or surrogate) cannot be explained as the result of a decision making process 
with  the  postulated  utility  function
5.  Nevertheless,  we  can  understand  it  as  an 





) , ,..., (



















u u u F
u u u F
p n
u u u U











                 [ ] 12  
3.-  The  most  interesting  case  is  that  in  which  there  are  multiple  solutions,  which 
typically happens when there are more parameters to be elicited than conditions to be 
satisfied by these parameters in the system  [ ] ￿} , 11 { Î g . To deal with this case, we 
propose to formulate the parameter elicitation problem as a dual problem of [ ] 10 . We 
do this by taking advantage of the general formulation of duality proposed by Johri 
(1993  and  1994).  Consider  problem  [ ] 10   as  the  primal  problem,  which  can  be 
formulated as: 
  ) , ,..., ( max 1







          [ ] 13  
*
1 1 {( ,..., , ) / ( ,..., ) 0, } n n u u F u u G º g = g = g  being the feasible set for  ) , ,..., ( 1 g n u u , where 
the value of  g  is fixed and denoted as g
* (since the decision maker is assumed to take 
it as given). Nevertheless, we include  g  as a (trivial) decision variable to fit the problem 









G Î g G Ê D
) , ,..., ( max min 1





          [ ] 14  
                                                 
5  For  example,  assume  that,  in  the  numerical  example  shown  in  section  2.2,  we  have  the  additional 
constraint  5 . 0 1 ³ w . Since the only combination of parameters that guarantee tangency in the observed 
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where the minimization is carried out over all the sets  D which include  G. Given the 
particular  nature  of  our  problem,  we  have  more  relevant  information  which  we  can 
include, as a constraint, in order to tighten the feasible set and pin down the solution. 










1 u , , u ¼ , the resulting restricted dual problem collapses to decide just g. Moreover, 




1 u , , u ¼   maximizes 
U( 1 q u , ,u ¼ ,g ).  In  an  operational  way,  we  can  do  it  by  including  the  optimality 
conditions [11]. Furthermore, any feasibility constraint  ￿ Î g  on the parameter values 
should also be included. Since the constraint  0 ) ,..., (
* *
1 = n u u F  holds by construction, it 
does not need to be explicitly imposed. Summing up, we propose to solve the following 










u u u F
u u u F
u u u U











) , ,..., (
) , ,..., (
. .







                [ ] 15  
 
Figure  3  shows  a  flow  chart  summarizing  the  proposed  method.  Note  that  case  1 
(single solution) can be seen as a particular case of case 3 (multiple solutions), so that, 
in practice, it is enough to solve  [ ] 15  and, if we are in case 1, i.e., the feasible set 
contains a single point, that point will trivially be the solution of [ ] 15 . 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
 
3. AN APPLICATION TO AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 
 
A  number  of  authors  have  pointed  out  that,  contrary  to  the  usual  assumption  in 
conventional  economics,  farmers  are  not  only  concerned  with  the  maximization  of 
profit,  but  other  attributes  such  as  risk,  management  complexity,  leisure  time, 
indebtedness, etc., are also involved in farmers’ decision making. See Gasson (1973), 
Smith and Capstick (1976) or Cary and Holmes (1982). More recently Willock et al. 
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Since  farmers  take  their  decisions  trying  to  simultaneously  optimize  a  range  of 
conflicting  objectives,  both  the  MCDM  paradigm  and  the  multiattribute  utility  theory 
seem  to  be  relevant  in  this  context.  In  this  section  we  present  an  application  to 
agricultural economics in order to test the multiplicative expression [1] as compared to 
the linear one [2] and to check if the former can provide some better performance (i.e., 
better ability to reproduce the observed behavior) in some cases. 
 
3.1. Case study 
 
The case study is a sample of 22 average farmers from the Douro basin in northern 
Spain. This basin is the greatest of Spanish rivers, with a surface of 78.954 km
2. The 
climate is warm Mediterranean
6, with long cold winters and short warm summers. The 
average rainfall ranges between 400 and 500 millimeters per year. The most important 
crops  in  this  area  are  strongly  dependent  on  CAP  (Common  Agricultural  Policy) 
subsidies and low value-added crops. In an average year, the main activities are winter 
cereals  (30%), maize  (25%),  sugar  beet (15%),  alfalfa  (10%),  sunflowers  (5%)  and 
other minor crops (15%). All the data used to feed the models were obtained both from 
official statistics and from a survey developed in the area under study during the 2000-
01 agricultural year. For more information on the survey and other elements of the case 
study see Gómez-Limón and Riesgo (2004).  
 
3.2. Mathematical model 
 
To  simulate  the  farmers’  decision-making  process  under  the  MAUT  framework,  we 
construct  a  mathematical  model  where  farmers  decide  the  value  of  their  decision 
variables, being limited by certain constraints, in order to achieve various objectives: 
 
Decision  variables.  Each  farmer  has  a  vector  x  of  decision  variables  xh,  where  xh 
measures the amount of land devoted to every particular crop, including winter cereals, 
maize, sugar beet, sunflowers, alfalfa, beans, potatoes and set-aside
7. 
 
Constraints. We identify the following constraints as applied to each farmer: 
                                                 
6 Papadakis classification (1965) 
7 Specifically, x1 is (amount of land devoted to) winter cereals, x2 is maize, x3 is sugar beet, x4 is alfalfa, x5 is 
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￿ Land constraint. The sum of all crops must be equal to the total surface available to 








￿ CAP constraints. To fulfill the CAP requirements, we included 20% of set-aside for 
cereal, oilseed and protein crops (COP crops). Any land devoted to set-aside greater 
than this percentage is excluded of EU subsidies, and this is taken as an invalid 
option in the model: 
Maximum set-aside:  ( ) 6 2 1 8 % 20 x x x x + + × £  
On the other hand, the CAP force farmers to withdraw at least the 10% of the land 
devoted to COP crops to obtain compensatory payments. This withdrawal is made in 
irrigated  and  non  irrigated  lands  bearing  in  mind  both  theoretical  yields.  A  good 
estimation of the set-aside in irrigated land is the observed data in the period under 
study: 
Minimum set-aside:  8 x observed withdraw ³  
Furthermore,  because  of  the  quota,  sugar  beet  is  limited  for  each  farmer  to  the 
maximum area in the period studied: 
Sugar beet quota:  3 x maximum sugar beet £  
￿ Agronomic constraints. For rotational conditions, land devoted to alfalfa have to rest 







where p is the number of years during the crop is on the land (4 for alfalfa) and q is 
the number of years off the land (3 for alfalfa). 
￿ Market constraints. Alfalfa and potatoes are the only perishable crops considered. 









Objectives. After the survey developed in the area, we concluded that farmers take the 
following objectives into account: 
￿ Maximization of total gross margin (TGM), as a proxy of profit since, in the short run, 
the  availability  of  structural  productive  factors  (land,  machinery,  etc.)  cannot  be 
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are  obtained  from  the  average  crop  margins  in  a  time  series  of  seven  years 
(1993/1994 to 1999/2000) in constant 2000 euros. According to this TGM can be 
calculate as follows:  ￿ × =
h
h h x GM TGM , where GMh represents the gross margin 
per unit of crop h. 
￿ Minimization of risk (VAR). As noted by several authors (for example Just and Pope, 
1979, Young, 1979, and Gómez-Limón et al., 2003), farmers typically have a marked 
risk aversion, so that risk is an important factor in agricultural activity. Following the 
conventional Markowitz (1952) approach, risk is measured by the variance of TGM: 
VAR=  [ ] h h x Cov x × × ' , where [Cov] is the variance-covariance matrix of the crop gross 
margins obtained from different crops, during the seven-year period. 
￿ Minimization of working capital (K). This objective represents the aim of reducing the 
level  of  indebtedness.  In  order  to  model  this  objective  we  divided  the  year  into 
months,  differentiating  in  this  way  the  periods  of  cropping  activities  (capital 
immobilization) and sales (income). In month m, the working capital (NWKm) is the 
sum of the working capital for the present month (￿ ×
h
h hm x WK ) and the working 
capital from the previous month (NWKm-1), whenever sales are less than the capital 
immobilization. Mathematically: 
m NWK x WK NWK m h
h
hm m " ³ - × - - ￿ 0 1
 
where WKhm is the working capital per unit of crop h in month m. 
The aim of a farmer is to minimize the maximum working capital (K), which can be 
represented as minimizing the maximum NWKm calculated for twelve months. To do 
that we use the minimax method, and therefore we introduce twelve new equations: 
m K NWKm " £  
 
In order to can test the ability of the MAUT approach to reproduce farmers’ behavior 
using  both  an  additive  and  a  multiplicative  MAUF  specification.  we  performed  the 
following experiment: 
 
1.- Taking into account the observed vector of decision variables of each farmer and 
the constraints of the problem, we elicit the parameters (weights) of a linear MAUF [2] 
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2.- We simulate the farmers’ behavior (decision variables) by maximizing the linear 
utility function (as estimated in the first step) subject to the constraints of the problem. 
3.- Compare the simulated decisions (obtained in the second step) with the observed 
ones for each farmer. 
4.- Repeat steps 1, 2 and 3 with the multiplicative specification [1] of the MAUF. 
5.-  Compare  the  performance  of  the  linear  and  the  multiplicative  specifications  to 




We  applied  the  procedure  described  above  to  each  representative  farmer  in  our 
sample. In most cases we came up with the result that the simulation ability of the 
multiplicative MAUF is better than the linear one. For further clarification, we present all 
the intermediate steps of our experiment in a representative case. 
 
Results for the additive MAUF 
 
Firstly we obtain a payoff matrix (in terms of utilities) with efficient solutions for all the 
columns, as explained in Annex A. The results are displayed in Table 1, in which we 
have included an additional column to show the real observed values. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Using the data in Table 1, and following Sumpsi et al. (1997) we estimate the weights 
of the different objectives solving problem [7], which takes the following form: 
3 ,..., 1 0 , ,
1
562 . 0 1 843 . 0 0
755 . 0 942 . 0 1 0
459 . 0 0 101 . 0 1 . .
) ( min
3 2 1
3 3 3 2 1
2 2 3 2 1






= w + w + w
= - + w × + w × + w ×
= - + w × + w × + w ×











p n i i i
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Solving this mathematical program, we obtain that the weight given by the analyzed 
farmer  to  TGM  maximization  is  1 w =31.9%  and  the  weight  of  risk  minimization  is 
2 w =68.1%. On the other hand, minimization of K does not appear to be taken into 
account  by  the farmer  in  his  decision-making  process  ( 3 w =0).  Using the  estimated 
weights for each objective, and taking ki= i w  (i=1,2,3) we get the following algebraic 
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02 . 297 , 56
0
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58 . 826 , 20 46 . 337 , 52





which can be simplified to  
VAR TGM U × - × = 094 . 0 12 . 10       [ ] 17  
 
Afterwards, we simulate the farmer’s behaviour by finding the values of the decision 
variables that maximize [ ] 17 . The results are shown in Table 2.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Results for the multiplicative MAUF 
 
Firstly, we obtain the equation of the hyperplane [ ] 9  that connects all the points of the 
payoff matrix. Forcing all the columns of the payoff matrix to satisfy  [ ] 9 , we have a 
three-equation system with the following solution: 
0 ) ( 744 . 0 ) ( 272 . 0 ) ( 1 = × + × + + - K u VAR u MBT u         [ ] 18  
 
Using the  i w ’s obtained in  [ ] 16 , we get the reference point as a linear combination of 
the  elements  of  the  payoff  matrix,  P
*  =  (0.388,  0.681,  0.574),  which  by  construction 
satisfies [ ] 9 . Finally, we elicit the parameters ki’s and k solving [ ] 15  which, in this case, 
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       [ ] 19  
where  * P  means that the associated expression is evaluated in the reference point 
P
*. The result of [16] is k1= 0.359, k2=0.087, k3= 0.274, k=1.665. This gives the following 
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which can be simplified to get: 
K VAR TGM K VAR
K TGM VAR TGM K VAR TGM U
× × × × + × × +
+ × × × + × × + × × - × × - × × =
-29
7 22 19 23
10 74 . 1 11 . 1
10 99 . 9 23 . 5 10 26 . 5 10 20 . 1 10 14 . 1   [ ] 20  
 
The last stage of the exercise is to simulate the farmer’s behaviour by maximizing [ ] 20  
subject to all the constraints of the model. The results are shown in Table 2, together 
with those from the linear utility function. In order to compare the performance of both 
approaches, we use a common validation approach by comparing the simulated and 
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of the absolute value of all the deviations as a percentage of total surface (Qureshi et 
al.,  1999).  In Table  2  we  can  observe  that  the  deviation  from  the simulated  to  the 
observed behaviour is lower when we use the multiplicative specification (34.70%) than 
when  we  use  the  additive  function  (67.28%),  meaning  that  the  multiplicative  utility 
function  allows  a  better  approximation  to  the  farmer’s  decision  making  process. 
Although  we  just  display  the  results  for  a  representative  farmer,  the  multiplicative 
approach turns out to be superior to the linear one for most of the cases in the sample. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this paper we have developed a non-interactive method based on duality to elicit the 
parameters of a nonlinear utility function to be compatible with the actual behaviour of 
the decision makers. The main idea is to make the observed decisions to be consistent 
with a rational decision making process by finding an expression of the utility function 
that  makes  the  observed  decision  to  be  (approximately)  optimal.  The  information 
needed  to  apply  this  method  is  (some  approximation  to)  the  efficient  set  and  the 
observed decisions. Moreover, we need to postulate a specific parametric expression 
for the multiattribute utility function. 
 
To assess the gain from using a multiplicative rather than additive utility function, we 
have developed an application in the field of agricultural economics. In this case study, 
we aim at reproducing the actual decisions of farmers using both the additive and the 
multiplicative specification suggested by Keeney and Raiffa (1976). Since the additive 
utility  function  can  be  taken  as  a  limiting  case  of  the  multiplicative  one,  it  can  be 
reasonably expected that (at least in some cases) the second will be more effective to 
simulate observed decisions. This intuition is confirmed in our empirical application, 
since the multiplicative approach turns out to be superior to the additive one. 
 
Some remarks should be made about the conditions for the suggested method to work 
successfully.  This  approach  rests  on  the  duality  relationship  between  the  elicitation 
problem [15] and problem [10], which is taken as a surrogate for the real problem of the 
decision  maker.  Henceforth,  the  performance  of  the  elicitation  procedure  crucially 
depends  on  how  accurate  is  [10]  to  approximate  the  real  problem  of  the  decision 
maker. In this sense, the method rests on the assumption that the decision maker is 
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enough to the efficient set and we have a good enough approximation to the efficient 
set, then the elicitation procedure developed here will provide a good approximation to 
the observed decisions by construction. On the other hand, inefficient decisions cannot 
be reconciled with a rational decision making process, so that the proposed method will 
be less successful to replicate observed decisions the less efficient these decisions 
are.  
 
Our elicitation procedure uses, as an input, an expression for the efficient set and, if the 
observed point is not efficient, a projection of the observed point on the efficient set is 
also needed. We have illustrated a simple linear procedure by combining the elements 
of the payoff matrix, which provides a good enough approximation for our case study 
but the elicitation procedure is also compatible with other (perhaps more sophisticated) 
methods. For more complex problems the efficient set will probably be more complex 
as well, so that it may be impossible to find an analytical expression for the whole 
efficient set. Note that we only need an expression for the relevant part of the efficient 
set, i.e. that where the reference point belongs. We suggest the following procedure for 
more complex problems: 1) find a discrete approximation to the efficient set (a number 
of efficient points). 2) Project the observed unit on the efficient set with a DEA method, 
taking the efficient points as decision making units. This provides n peer units for the 
observed point. 3) Find the equation of the hyperplane connecting these n points. 
 
Finally,  we  can  observe  that  in  general  a  large  number  of  utility  functions  could 
reproduce a single observed decision. Then, some additional information should be 
included  to  select  a  specific  expression  for  the  MAUF.  Our  procedure  uses  the 
tangency  condition  which  has  to  be  satisfied  in  interior  solutions,  so  that  corner 
solutions  are  treated  as  interior.  To  illustrate  this,  assume  the  problem  is  that 
represented in Figure 4, where ABCDE is the feasible set. The observed point P is 
projected on the corner point A. This solution can be rationalized by different utility 
functions.  We  show  three  possibilities  associated  with  three  different  indifference 
curves, labelled 1, 2 and 3. By construction, our method picks up the MAUF associated 
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ANNEX A: Computing the (efficient) payoff matrix 
 
If  there  are  n  criteria  and  ) (x fi   denotes  the  value  of  the  i-th  criterion  (i=1,…,n) 
depending on the decision variables, the first element of the first column in the payoff 
matrix can be obtained by solving the problem: 
W Î x t s
x f
. .
) ( max 1             [ ] 1 - A  
 
The optimal value  ) (x f1  resulting from [ ] 1 - A , denoted as  11
*
1 f f º , is the first entry 
of  the  payoff  matrix.  To  obtain  the  other  entries  of  the  first  column,  we  substitute 
) ( max arg 1 x f   in  ) (x fi ,  for  i=2,…,  n.  The  rest  of  the  columns  are  obtained  by 
implementing similar calculations, i.e., the generic element  ij f  is obtained by plugging 
) ( max arg x f j  in  ) (x fi . In some cases, the payoff matrix could not be unique, that is, 
problem  [ ] 1 - A  could have alternative optimal solutions, and some of them could be 
inefficient. For example, assume there are only 2 objectives and the feasible set is 
represented by ABCDEFG in Figure 2. Then, when optimizing objective 1, we could 
obtain any point on the segment AB
8, but it is convenient to choose B, which is efficient, 


















) ( ), ( max Lex
        [ ] 2 - A  
meaning that objective i is maximized and, if some alternative optima exist, then an 
arbitrary linear combination of the other objectives (with  0   >   j a ,  i j ¹ " )
9 is optimized 
without worsening the performance of objective i. By solving q problems like [ ] 2 - A , 
we obtain efficient solutions for all the columns of the payoff matrix. 
 
                                                 
8 More specifically, when using a simplex algorithm, we could obtain either A or B. 
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Moreover, we transform all the (optimal and observed) objectives by substituting into 
the mono-attribute utility functions, so that the resulting values can be taking as utilities. 
In  our  application,  we  select  the  usual  mono-attribute  utility  transformation 
( ) ) f f ( ) f ) x ( f ( ) x ( f u ) x ( u i *
*
i i * i i i i - - = º  where  *
i f ) ( *i f  denotes the best (worst) value 
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[ ] { }
1 n Min U(u *, ,u *)
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  Objective to be optimised  Observed Value 
Value obtained  u(TGM)  u(VAR)  u(K)   
u(TGM)  1  0.101  0.000  0.459 
u(VAR)  0.000  1  0.942  0.755 
u(K)  0.000  0.843  1  0.562 
 







  Multiplicative utility function  Additive utility function 
  Values (ha)  Values (ha) 
Crops  Observed  Simulated 
Deviation 





31.29  26.75  4.54  31.29  14.27  17.02 
Maize  6.33  16.96  -10.63  6.33  13.83  -7.50 
Sugar-beet  16.71  13.2  3.51  16.71  13.11  3.59 
Sunflowers  2.58  0.00  2.58  2.58  15.69  -13.12 
Alfalfa  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Beans  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Potatoes  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Set-aside  4.38  4.38  0.00  4.38  4.38  0.00 
TOTAL  61.29  61.29 
21.27 
(34.70%) 




TABLE  2.  COMPARISON  BETWEEN  BOTH  METHODOLOGIES  FOR  THE 
FARMER’S DECISION-MAKING 
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